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(Continued from p. 275)
It
is therefore evident that our belief must be founded
upon what God himself taught us. It is not then the
question whether our views be absurd or reasonable,
in accordance with or against the spirit of the age;
because neither principle stands in a necessary
connexion with revelation. We do not say, that
anything taught by God is unreasonable or
incompatible with the ideas prevalent now, or at any
other time; but only that any such standard as we
allude to is not calculated from its nature to teach
us religious truths. For at last what one man calls
reasonable another may, with the best light he has,
style absurd; or what is perfectly consonant with
the notions generally prevailing in this year, that
is the current spirit of the age, may fall within
the next twelve months beneath the axe of some
sharp-witted critic, who may then succeed in
disencumbering the earth of their presence. Let him
who denies or doubts our proposition examine the
course of politics for the last twenty-five years in
the United States, England, France, Germany, and
Turkey, without taking into view the other European,
Asiatic, and American states; and then let him tell
us candidly how many spirits the age has witnessed
in this <<326>>comparatively brief space.
In
this country let us take for instance the
institution of slavery. We well recollect the time
when the very slave-owners were unanimous in
pronouncing it the greatest curse under which they
laboured: it was at a time when the northern section
of the Union looked upon slave-owning with a great
degree of indifference; some were, indeed, always
opposed to it, who would now and then lend their aid
in getting a slave liberated, or assist him in his
escape; but we have seen a great, almost a total
change in this important consideration, for in the
same degree that at the North, where there is no
property in man, the abhorrence of slaveholding has
increased, so has a corresponding mutation taken
place in the ideas of many Southerners, so that even
females now advocate the state of bondage as the
happiest for the African race, and besides maintain
that it is an institution which may be aptly called
patriarchal, and promotive of mutual blessing to the
master and servant.
Let the unprejudiced think of such a phrase, the
blessings of slavery, and and then assert that
the spirit of the age is not a curious weathercock,
capable of turning to all the points of the compass
with perfect ease, with the most imperturbable
gravity. We take it for granted that both
Southerners and Northerners are equally sincere in
their views; that the one loves as ardently as the
other detests the presence of negro bondmen; and the
inquiry is therefore a legitimate one, If the spirit
of the age, and if human reason, are sure and good
guides to a knowledge of right how does it happen
that whilst in one section of the
same country the detestation against a certain order
of things increases, a corresponding change on the
other side takes place, on the other side of an
imaginary line which divides various states from
each other? We are not going to indite a political
article—our readers need not fear this; but we put
before them a familiar illustration, and thereby
prove to them that they would not themselves, in
ordinary affairs, follow blindly their own or
other’s reasons, aided though they be by the general
spirit which prevails around them, unless they be
prepared to swear allegiance to a new set of
opinions perhaps every month in the year.
<<327>>
We say, therefore, that of all things religion is
the least capable of being measured by the arbitrary
standard which changing ideas and circumstances may
produce. Admitting even that there is a general
chain of ideas commonly pervading any particular
generation—for none but a man devoid of common sense
and the power of observing passing events would deny
it—there is nevertheless not the least doubt, that
there is a rising and falling in the barometer of
public sentiment, effected by and through means
which almost escape the search of the keenest
observer, and over which no man living can have
ample control, no matter how he may contribute to
the general action by which the public mind is
agitated. We cannot now stop to argue the question
at length, even if it were not so self-evident as we
conceive it to be; and we only laid it prominently
before our readers, because we have often seen and
heard the spirit of the age brought forward as an
element in the argument for or against the
observance of religious duties, or the maintaining
of certain ideas connected with religious belief.
Our men of the resent day constantly appeal to us
whether we could be serious to maintain the
antiquated notions of ancient though pious Judaism;
but pray, good friends, tell us why not? What is
there in its antiquity which should cause us to
reject it? You say the age has progressed beyond the
point of belief and practice where the preceding one
has left it; wherefore we must progress to some
point wherein we can bring it in conformity with the
philosophical or philanthropic ideas evolved in the
latest times. But without much argument, it is clear
that we are referred to a very uncertain and
changing standard.
We
are not now where a previous age has left us, it is
said; but again we are not informed as to the
precise time when the ancient ideas became absurd,
and when the new ones, granted we could define them,
took their place. Again we might ask where are we to
look for them? where is the authority which we are
to follow? in what book are the new principles
clearly and well defined? We may be answered,
perhaps, that our questions are silly, and show but
a small acquaintance with the progress of events;
that changes are gradual, and run imper<<328>>ceptibly
into each other, like the colours of the rainbow the
outside tints alone are distinctly defined, as the
emerging from barbarism and the full light of
civilized intelligence; but that the intermediate
changes present such gradual stages of progress as
to be of necessity not readily distinguishable.
Well, we will admit it, that the human mind is in a
constant state of transition, wrought upon by
extraneous circumstances, and internal, natural,
spontaneous fermentation; but what does this prove?
Simply this: that if we have no better standard of
comparison than human reason and the state of
progress of society, we have nothing but a
constantly changing means of measuring the value of
human actions, or in other words, no better system
of morals and moral ideas than what is derived from
the momentary situation of each individual in the
first place, or society at large in the second. We
know well enough that there are many whose
conscience is so plastic, who are always ready with
their Jesuitic distinguo, “I make a
distinction here,” upon each and every occasion; to
whom this is lawful to-day which is prohibited
to-morrow, and who find this reasonable and
perfectly consonant with science and nature, which
in a brief time is foolish and valueless in their
eyes.
But what sort of philosophy can this be? what morals
can thus rule the world? are we to deny God because
a revolutionary tribunal declares its unbelief in
the existence of the Supreme? are we to practise
immorality because a Louis XIV. or Charles II. or a
George IV. happens to set an unblushing example of
royal impudence? And yet, unless such reasoning can
be admitted, that the spirit of the age, for the
time being, can sanctify and excuse everything, we
must at once admit that such a guide cannot be
safely followed, and that inconsequence reason alone
even demands that we should adopt a measure
independent of the caprice and the fashionable
example of the moment.
Notwithstanding this claim for a universal standard
is so necessary, and existing within the nature of
things, we will not on the other hand deny what is
too evident to escape any one’s notice, and this is,
that do what we will, our views and conceptions of
things are greatly modified by the influences which sur<<329>>round us. Let us start in life with
whatever system of education we please, and let us
mingle with those who have been differently brought
up, or whose conduct differs materially from what we
have been taught to regard as right and proper, and
we must insensibly lose a part of our abhorrence for
what they think and practise.
Our disgust, even if we feel this at first, will, by
degrees, lose its intensity, till we at last,
perhaps, adopt or admire what in the outset shocked
our sensibility, or wounded our conscience. We find
the same influence on society at large, and whole
sections become infected with views originally
strange to them by becoming familiar with them
through example, and hence we can trace very
frequently a gradual approximation of two races,
where they are placed in juxtaposition; so that one
or both lose, by degrees, their entire identity, and
amalgamate into a new tribe, similar in some, and
dissimilar in other respects to what either or both
were originally. Even where an entire fusion does
not take place, we shall witness, nevertheless, a
great approximation, a diminution, if we may so
express it, of the distance which marked originally
their peculiar characteristics. This change, slow or
rapid, depends greatly in its development upon the
original habits of the races on their first becoming
acquainted; but even under the most favourable
circumstances for keeping up a separate identity,
the influence is nevertheless marked, and easily
traceable by any one who regards outward facts as
derived from a latent inward cause and who can
discover the secret springs of action.
All that we have said proves, that to let moral
principles be the result of accidental
circumstances, would be an admission that none
whatever existed. Gradual changes wrought by contact
or an internal development of progress or
retrogression, as the phenomenon may be regarded
from different points of view, would constantly
modify our rule of life, and the principles by which
it must be governed so far at least as outward deeds
are the exponents of the sentiments which the actors
entertain; and hence we could assign no fixed
rule in a system of education by which we could
advise those who are entering on life to govern
their conduct; which is tantamount with saying that
no proper <<330>>rule of life or morality, in the strict sense
of the word, has any existence.
This admission may suit well the notions of the man
of pleasure, to whom the gratification of his
desires is the greatest good. But how does it tally
with the existence of religion? or rather, can you
imagine religion to exist, if you destroy the
existence of a fixed moral law? what is religion, in
fact, but the code of the highest morals,
contemplate it in whatever light you may? If
religion had so precarious a tenure, if, indeed, it
were not identical and uniform in all countries and
times, it would not be worth while to give it any
more attention than the world in general bestows on
the dreams and fancies of philosophers and other
moral experimentalists. Our readers will of course
understand us as referring particularly to the
religion we profess, Judaism, and as saying of it,
that it would be of no actual value if it could
change with a mutation of climate, and the lapse of
a few years, and take up a new garb, and appear in
any dress or colour which surrounding influences
might for the moment impart to it. It is either a
positive something, or it is not.
If
we admit the latter, how absurd will it appear for
us to maintain a distinct position in society when
it at best would amount to a mere negation of what
others say, which would then define Judaism to be an
opponent of Christianity, the doctrine of Mahomed,
Paganism, or whatever other systems there may exist
on the earth. But if we regard it in the first
light, as a positive something, distinct in its
character from all other views as respects morals
and obligations entertained by other men, it rises
to the highest importance imaginable, for its truth
does not then depend upon the erroneousness so much
of other systems, as on the inherent truth of
itself, on its own integral elevation, usefulness,
beatifying influence, and consistency with itself.
We
need not argue the point to convince our readers
what side of the question they should adopt, since
we hold it for self-evident, that they would all
cease to be Jews, if they did not with us believe in
its excellence as a system of duty and belief
irrespective of any other. To say then that we
should only view it as compatible with vacillating
reason, or the changing spirit of the age, would be
to strip it at once of its permanence and
<<331>>consistent character; for, as hinted above, we
should then have to ascertain daily the peculiar
state of development which reason has acquired, and
the precise point to which the spirit of the age
would lead us. We do not say that we wish to strip
religion of the sanction of reason, or that we
desire to prevent its harmonizing with the outward
state of progress of society, where this is possible
without doing violence to great and permanent
principles; but we boldly maintain that religious
truths do not depend upon the circumstances which
influence mere human inventions; but even these at
last are true, if proved by experience, whatever
theorists may advance to the contrary.
For instance, the idea of Copernicus, in regard to
the solar system, that the earth is not the centre
of all creation, but only a planet revolving round
the sun, was unquestionably true, when this great
philosopher first announced it. Was its truth
destroyed because the popes of Rome denounced it as
a heresy? because Galileo was imprisoned for
promulgating this system full a hundred years later?
because he was compelled to renounce it as false and
heretical, whilst he immediately thereafter
exclaimed, “and still she moves?”
Not an infant will maintain such an absurdity; and
still Copernicus advanced a truth against the reason
and spirit of his age, and Galileo defended it a
hundred years later, and suffered for so doing,
against the alleged conviction and the spirit of the
men of his age and country. How would it stand with
science, were it to yield to any crude notion which
might be maintained against its truth or
advancement? are therefore facts not facts, because
they do not square with the preconceived notions of
one or the other tyro in knowledge? And still
religion, the highest and best of human sciences—for
as applicable to life it is an integral portion of
scientific education—is to be subjected to a test
the most arbitrary and uncertain imaginable,— the
fashion of the day, the caprice of the hour; and we
are told to modify it, in order that it may under no
consideration come in conflict with the spirit of
change, the momentary fan of political and moral
experimentalists!
No, this will never do; we must have some definite
and fixed principle from which to start, and on
which to erect our moral structure, not merely a
<<332>>series of duties which are commonly styled
morals, but the whole organization of the inner man,
as opposed to physical or outward education.
In
truth, however, if one examines with any degree of
candour, not merely to support a theory of his own,
the history of our people, he will have to
acknowledge that we always had a uniform principle
of the kind demanded, this being the revelation
of the will of God, as we sincerely believed it to
be, contained in the series of books commonly called
the BIBLE. Our brothers formerly were not apt to ask
whether their views were reasonable, or in concert
with the opinions of their neighbours, of friends,
or of foes; for they were in a glaring opposition,
in a constant warfare of endurance; and it
was their clashing with the opinions of their
masters and rulers, their false friends and
treacherous oppressors, which caused all the
persecutions and sufferings of which history
furnishes no parallel.
We
must then assume one of two ideas, either that they
were right, or that they were wrong. If the latter,
we may pity their blindness, but never can admire
the obstinate perseverance with which they clung to
opinions, which, under this assumption, were not
alone valueless but hurtful; but if the former, we
have no other course open to us, but to follow
strictly in their footsteps, for it certainly cannot
be reasonable in us to forego what is right and just
in itself. We may be met by the objection that our
ancestors strove against oppression, that men
endeavoured to force upon them doctrines which they
felt unwilling to adopt, because they could not
understand their cogency, and that their very belief
in a coming redeemer sprang from the cruelties to
which they were subjected; that in their suffering
the ills of the moment, their excited fancy pictured
to them a glory in store for them, and they enjoyed
this anticipated pleasure, although they knew it
hidden in the recesses of the future, if even it
were one day to be developed; but that as now we are
treated more humanely, as we are either equals in
political rights, or at all events everywhere
approaching this desirable goal,—that now, it is
said, it is not necessary, not proper to uphold a
principle of separation, to look for a future which
is hostile to the happiness of the present
<<333>>moment.
If, however, we resolve this into common language,
it amounts to this, that it was well enough to have
a positive Judaism, separate and distinct from other
religions, whilst these
oppressed us; but that, as they have ceased, or may
hereafter cease to be persecutors, we may as well
give up what at best is but fancy, and neither
reasonable nor compatible with our duty to the
state; whether this be Heathen, Mahomedan,
Christian, Greek, Roman, Armenian, or whatever else
you please.
We
confess that this exposition is extremely absurd; as
it would justify ancient Judaism under the dominion
of the Russian czar, and make it useless, nay,
opposed to the well-being of the state in England,
France, America, and elsewhere, where we enjoy
political rights; and hence our religion would not
depend so much upon internal truth as upon the
adventitious circumstance of political freedom or
oppression.
But absurd as it is, it is not a whit more so than
the ideas of many of our modern teachers, who
profess to have discovered that our opinions of
positive Judaism are unfounded in philosophy, and
against the spirit of the age, and hence they
reject, in addition to many observances, principally
the doctrine of the Messiah and the resurrection of
the dead. We regret that we have not at hand any of
the arguments, if there be any, emanating from our
reformers, in order to combat them, as it is not
easy to write against mere unbelief, unconnected
with any tangible features which one has at last to
combat.
But having undertaken to do it, we will not
relinquish the task, but ask the indulgence of our
readers, whether they assent or differ from us,
whilst we endeavour to give reasons for the faith
which we have received from our fathers, and which
we honestly believe to be in accordance with reason
and Scripture, and more reconcilable with our duties
to the state than the mere negative which some of
the moderns uphold. We beg, also, of our friends to
call our attention to any omission or incongruity
which they may discover, in order that the
discussion may be carried on with all due regard to
truth and candour.
In
the outset we are perfectly aware that we shall be
charged with being behind the age; but this has no
terrors for us, as we <<334>>have already exhibited
above that such a standard is both arbitrary and
fallacious. In the second place, we shall be told
that Jewish teachers of former ages advanced many
incongruities, which the light of reason must
reject. Against this we shall only answer, that if
our teachers spoke according to the state of science
prevailing in their time, it was all that could be
expected of them and if experience has proved their
opinions in part extravagant, we may freely reject
such excrescence, without thereby parting with the
sober truth which lay at the bottom of their
opinions. But who warrants us, that in adopting an
hyperbolical mode of instruction, they had not in
view some such ideas, that it was dangerous for them
to express their thoughts plainly?
We
all know, that there were many seasons when it was a
penal offence under the laws of our tyrants to
preach publicly the doctrines of our religion, that
faith which they hated. May it not therefore be
possible, nay, likely, that our teachers were
compelled to clothe their thoughts in the vestments
of the absurd and preposterous so as to find an
entrance with their scholars, who could thus
propagate them farther, whilst the jealous tyrants
were lulled into security, not knowing that under
this grotesque guise, grave and important doctrines
were securely propagated, whilst they were employing
all their power to arrest the hated religion of
Israel?
One thing we may maintain without fear of
contradiction,—that the Rabbis always referred to
the Scriptures for the support of their theological
views and hence, admitting even that they taught
extravagances which are totally inadmissible, we may
at last do what they did, turn to the revealed pages
of the Bible, and draw thence what the prophets left
unto us, as glimpses which we may take into the
distant future and sure we are that in a doctrinal
argument our ancient sages would have admitted no
other arbiter, however they might have theorized
upon those points on which revelation does not
afford them any certain clue. That their
speculations. may have taken the garb of the state
of public opinion prevailing around them, is nothing
to be wondered at it would have been strange indeed,
if they had been so far above the general degree of
knowledge of the world in their days, as to show no
traces of <<335>>the superstition which was then the
common lot of mankind.
But who can therefore maintain, that they did not
leave us a correct belief as the Bible teaches it?
that in the main principles they were right, because
scriptural? It would be something more than curious,
to discover that all ancient Judaism was but a
dream, and that it was reserved for the modern
followers of Spinoza or Hegel to teach us true
doctrines. Let us admit therefore, that some
incongruities were actually believed in and taught
by our teachers, and that these must be rejected, by
the force of conviction which modern scientific
development has shed upon the world: still we do not
admit in the remotest sense of the word, that the
doctrines which are derivable from Scripture are
untrue, because of any extravagance that was at one
time or the other attached to them.
We
regret that an attack of sickness, under which we
have been labouring for some weeks, has suddenly
assumed such a sinful shape, that deep reflection is
denied us for a time; wherefore we are compelled to
break off this month, much shorter than we intended.
But we trust that we have presented to the reader
some wholesome thoughts on which he may reflect with
profit for some days till we meet again.
(To be continued.) |
